THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA CHARLESTON DIVISION IN RE: M.I. WINDOWS AND DOORS, INC. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION : 2:12 MN 1 Status Conference held Wednesday, September 19, 2012, commencing at 1:36 p.m., before the Hon. David C. Norton, in Courtroom II, United States Courthouse, 81 Meeting St., Charleston, South Carolina, 29401. REPORTED BY DEBRA LEE POTOCKI, RMR, RDR, CRR P.O. Box 835 Charleston, SC 29402 843/723-2208 

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THE COURT: I've got CMO-3; I appreciate y'all agreeing on that one, so we'll enter that order. We'll enter CMO-3. Okay? Any objection to that?

MR. BRYSON: No, Your Honor. That's all I had.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, this is Tom Smith, a partner of mine out of Pennsylvania, who I don't know if --

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor, we negotiated long and hard with plaintiffs on CMO-3, and happy to say that just about an hour ago we finished it up. So we're happy to be able to present it.

THE COURT: Great. So we'll enter that, all right?

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, Dan Bryson for the

plaintiffs, and Justin Lucey. We would suggest that we go to

CMO-2. And over the last couple of hours we've made

significant progress on ironing out some of our differences on

that, and if we could approach the bench and give you an

additional color-coded copy of that.

THE COURT: Thanks for the color-coded copy, it does make it a lot easier for us to figure out where the competing -- But next time, after having read it electronically yesterday and earlier this morning, I finally got around to reading the footnote, so next time make a big red arrow to say the footnotes are important this time, all right? But I got them.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, going into CMO-2, with

regard to really trying to set forth a lot of procedures with regard to obviously discovery, how we're going to proceed with discovery, we have eliminated the fact sheet profile sheet section. We thought that would be helpful, but there was objection to that, so we took that out. That was probably the most significant change from the version that you have. So really just going to the colored portion, yellow, again, are suggestions that we think should be in there; blue for MI; green, it's a contractor section that Mr. Hahn can address. And it is color coded, that means one or two of the parties disagree to that particular language. The red language that you have in front of you now indicates those areas where we have reached a tentative agreement.

I might add that — so the first fundamental issue that we have, Your Honor, is how to proceed with discovery. And really going to Section D, master written discovery by homeowner and contractor plaintiffs. You know, it is our position that we would, as a homeowner group representing homeowners in multiple states, would have specific discovery that we would like to provide to the defendant MI.

Indeed, we've agreed to give them a master set of our discovery by next Friday, and to move that process along. A lot of that discovery, quite candidly, will mirror a lot of discovery that was already served in the underlying case, but we're refining it. But to large extent it will be discovery

that's already been sent, seen and provided to MI and addressed. But that's neither here nor there. We will have that by next Friday.

THE COURT: Does that mean the day after tomorrow or a week from day after tomorrow?

MR. BRYSON: I think a week from day after tomorrow.

The issue — there is some issue with regard to how many document requests can we have, including subparts. But fundamentally, Your Honor, there is a problem with do we get to have a set of discovery, the contractor get to have a set of discovery, and then MI has to answer both sets of discovery. We certainly, again, want to have our own particular set of discovery, and think that the contractors may have their own set of discovery. After they see ours, we'll have ours within ten days, and they can decide if that's duplicative of what they were thinking, or if they have some additional questions.

Certainly any documents that are produced, information that's produced, answers that are produced, they would have access to that information. But that's a fundamental problem that the parties have now, that we've not been able to overcome that hurdle, is MI, and they can certainly state their own position on it, thinks it ought to be just one set of discovery from both parties; we think it should be two sets of discovery, and feel pretty strongly about that. And that

really is the issue.

Does Your Honor want to have them address each position as we move along, and those  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$ 

THE COURT: Probably easier to get it. What about the contractors, Mr. Hahn?

MR. HAHN: Thank you, Judge. If I may, the issue that Mr. Bryson's touched on flows through this entire document. And that issue is, at the last status conference Mr. Lucey said that he believed that 89 percent of the discovery was done and he just needed a little bit and was ready to go. I understand that position that he has. That creates a conflict with this MDL moving forward.

THE COURT: I think the basic question is, do you agree with Mr. Bryson that you want your own separate set of discovery?

MR. HAHN: No, sir, Your Honor. What I think we ought to have is what the MDL process calls for and the manual calls for is we have joint discovery. However, I understand their concern. And they don't want to sit and wait, they don't want to share what they've already got in the bag with us, and they don't want to sit around waiting for us to catch up before the case moves forward, which creates the conflict. And I, quite frankly, don't know how to deal with it. And it flows not only with requests to produce, it will be interrogatories, it will be depositions, and all the way

through this process. And I apologize to the Court for even putting this forward, but I am at a loss, Judge.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, and this is -- I do agree that this is -- we have a fundamental issue which transcends everything that we're here to discuss today. It's our position and the position of the Manual on Complex Litigation, that the MDL process should be a coordinated process. And it's been difficult for to us have discussions about where we're going with some of this, because we can't get everyone under the same tent in that regard.

You know, we would prefer, and I think the rules and the philosophy of an MDL anticipate that there would be efficiencies brought to the process as a result of the MDL, that for whatever discovery tool is being used, there would be some coordination on this side, on this side of the table, as the two PSCs seek to build their own cases, they're coordinating what they're doing, and we're responding to a consolidated managed set of discovery. And we're not there at present. And as has just been stated, I'm not sure where to go with that. I don't know whether a mediation of sorts is in order.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, if I might add, and just a few more comments. Mr. Hahn's comments are much more overarching than the issue I was addressing with regard to discovery. We have agreement, for example, with MI and with

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Mr. Hahn's agreement on the number, that there will be, I don't know, 25 depositions taken of certain number of witnesses. You know, certain that the duration of those depositions, we've negotiated that on how long they would be. Absolutely and certainly, before those depositions of an MI representative, we will meet with Mr. Hahn and agree to who goes first, how much time do you guys need, how much time do we need, do you want to go first on this one, we'll go first on the next one, they've produced all these documents, let's look at the documents and let's make a decision on this particular witness. We have no problem, and we're stating that for the record that we agree that coordination's necessary. But we're talking about with regard to a discovery request that we have. We have a specific set of homeownerrelated discovery that we want to ask, as Your Honor has heard through two days of hearings, and again, based on how Your Honor rules, there's a number of questions and things we have to explore and answer to prove the various legal causes of actions that we have. And then I guess going into the more fundamental issue that will come up in just a few minutes, perhaps, is when these documents are produced, and they'll produce them into a CD, we want to code these documents ourselves in a proprietary way among the homeowner plaintiff group. Because we have a number of issues that we've learned from experience that manufacturers don't think there's a

problem with their product, and they look to blame it on contractors for installation, they blame it on homeowners for maintenance, you know, they have a number of defenses that manufacturers assert. We would be having, as we go through documents, we will be coding them. And even now I feel like I'm revealing kind of some of our work product, but I think that it's necessary that we have things that we're looking at, that we code the documents that we think that we have a right to keep that type information confidential.

Because even one day down the line, there's a resolution of this case, there could be contractor claims, you know, we heard that come up from Mr. Perrone when he argued, you know, you guys just need to be going and filing a lawsuit against the builder.

Who knows what we may do one day, except that with regard to the documents that are produced to us, these would be documents that could be shared by them. Nobody is saying keep the documents to themselves. It's just with regard to our coding of our documents that we would want to do that and keep that proprietary to ourselves. But we have no problem sharing the information that's produced by MI with Mr. Hahn, and then coordinating discovery.

So I don't really see where the problem is. We have right now ten different pending lawsuits that we're having to do discovery on. And we're just asking, you know, that we be

able to submit a set of master discovery for all ten of those states, and that we do that in a manner that we would produce by -- we would have ready by next Friday.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HAHN: Your Honor, if he's going to make a representation on the record, we're relying on that, and we'll deal with other issues as they come up.

THE COURT: So you don't have any problem with the homeowners committee keeping proprietary their coding of the documents with regard to their claims?

MR. HAHN: No, sir, we talked about that. That a larger issue with that is, which we'll just have to work through, is they want their own depository of the database. And so we'll have two databases. And there will be some, I expect, problems, because of technology, that one database didn't want the documents, the other one does. Through nobody's fault, it's just going to happen, and we'll have to deal with how to handle that.

THE COURT: But you're not saying that Document A is going to be Document A in your database and Document A in your database; you're not putting different numbers on them, are you?

MR. HAHN: I would hope not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I would hope not, too, because if you do,
I'll shoot every one of you.

MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: So, yes, sir.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, this is really a significant concern of ours. The argument for the JPML was that we want to have consolidated process for discovery. It creates an incredible mine field for us to have to segregate what we're doing in terms of discovery. Whatever database is produced in response to a master set of discovery, needs to be a single database. What happens in terms of splitting that up after it's produced, we don't really care. But the production has got to be the same. The attorney-client privilege analysis as to specific documents has to be the same and consistent, so that there are common rulings. Otherwise, we've got a bifurcated MDL.

MR. BRYSON: You know, I don't get it. Aren't they going to -- they're going to produce documents, and any documents you produce pursuant to our discovery requests, Mr. Hahn gets a copy of it. You produce them -- I think you have the opportunity on DVDs or CDs, however you want to produce them, you make a single Bates stamp on your documents when you produce them. We give a copy to him so he can code them the way he wants, we have them, we code them the way we want on the issues we think are important, and we're all on the same page.

And if you produce documents that are specifically

responsive to his discovery requests, we get a copy of them, we have them. We're all -- you're not having to do things -- I don't understand any duplicate fashion.

MR. FARRIER: I don't know how to say this other than to do it sort of visually. As long as we are producing one time sort of on that side of the room, what happens after it goes on that side of the room, we don't care about.

There's a technical issue about whether or not there's a common database to start out with, and whether that's segregated or not. But it creates difficulty if no one knows which document is being — has actually been produced. As long as we all, including the Court, can, with confidence, say yes, this document was produced, or this privilege was claimed on this specific day on this specific basis, then that's a system we can work with.

THE COURT: Okay. So you and your documents, you're going to Bates stamp, I guess, each of your documents, right?

MR. FARRIER: Yes.

THE COURT: And those Bates stamped defendants' documents are going to be produced to whatever, to a master place. Everybody is going to have the same documents that you produce, then you're going to access them and use your coding, and you're going to access them and use your coding.

MR. FARRIER: Correct.

MR. HAHN: I'm sorry, Judge, they're talking about

two separate databases. Complete. So --

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THE COURT: Who's talking about two separate databases?

MR. HAHN: The homeowners. I thought we'd have one database, and I'd access them separately, us my coding, they'd access them separately using their coding. That's not what they're interested in. They want two separate databases.

MR. BRYSON: I think that's another issue, Judge.

We're talking about the documents would be produced. We have a hard drive that the documents were loaded into with a program, a proprietary program, I think we're going to use Concordance, that we code and use our issues and we'll go at it.

The storage mechanism for it is not, you know, that's not very expensive. They would get the documents. As I understand it, Mr. Hahn is going to use a company called ILS. And quite candidly, we talked to ILS, they're a lot more expensive than what we were willing to spend the money on. But we have a law firm that's involved as part of our PSC, they have access to the proprietary Concordance database, which is well known and well used, and that's what we wanted to use.

So the software to code is what's different, and they have it, the documentation, there will be a consistency of the documents that are produced and they're not going to get

conflicting Bates numbers or anything of that nature.

THE COURT: Well, let's start step one. Mr. Farrier is worried about having to produce -- all he wants to do is produce them one time to wherever it's going to go. Right?

Do you have any problem with that?

MR. BRYSON: Do not. They're producing it on a DVD.

THE COURT: Do you have any problem with that? All he's doing is producing it one time.

MR. HAHN: No, sir.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FARRIER: There was a little bit of a caveat there. Assuming a single document depository. And the way I would look at it visually is as we produce, we're going to put it in the barn. Those guys can work out access to the barn, what they can take out of the barn, who sees what is being taken out. So that if there's a question later on in a deposition, as a practical matter, somebody says, I've never seen this document before, we can go to the barn and prove that it's there.

MR. BRYSON: There's been some negotiations that are actually in the ESI order that may contravene a bit what I just said; Mr. Lucey wants to address that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HAHN: If I may, Judge, one way that might deal with this is ILS is a third-party vendor. If the defendants

dump all the documents into ILS' database, then the homeowners can go, can be notified, we just got a dump, they can go to that database and get them. And everything is out of that database they get it. Then they can put it on Concordance or whatever they want to do with it, and it's there. And we can deal with the cost of — that little bit of storage is minimal, and they can deal with that cost between the parties.

MR. LUCEY: Your Honor, the issue of databases is downstream really from the issue that the defendant is addressing and that I believe the Court needs to deal with.

The defendant is going to produce its data on ten DVDs or one hard drive. There will be a duplicate copy of that hard drive. Mr. Hahn can have a copy of the hard drive, we'll have a copy of the hard drive. At that point each party has exactly what Mr. Farrier produced. Each party is entitled to load that into the fanciest or simplest database they want, code it or whatever else. There's been an identical production, it is already coded by MI, there's no room for dispute. Any firm I know takes a snapshot of that hard drive the moment it comes, so everybody always knows what's on that hard drive. And it actually gets more technical than that.

But for simplicity purposes, they're not putting it in a barn, so to speak. They're going to put it on a hard drive, there will be two identical hard drives. I'll be happy to personally pay for the second hard drive. And each group of

defendants will have the identical production. 1 2 THE COURT: All Mr. Farrier cares is he just has one 3 document dump, whether you dump it on a hard drive or a 4 warehouse. That solves your problem, right? 5 MR. FARRIER: It does, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Now, what problem does that create for 7 y'all? 8 MR. HAHN: If he dumps it one time, we have to saw it 9 in half. That's all. 10 THE COURT: No, you don't have to saw it in half, you have to duplicate it. Electronically that's --11 12 MR. HAHN: As long as we have the exact duplicate, I 13 quess we'll move forward with that. I envision down the road 14 that might produce some tension, but we'll just have to deal 15 with that, and I'm happy to deal with it. 16 THE COURT: Produce some tension how? 17 MR. HAHN: Because technologically it's never that 18 simple, when you're dealing with hundreds of thousands of 19 pieces of paper. 20 THE COURT: Well, that's something that certainly 21 isn't defendant's fault or the plaintiffs' fault, that's 22 technology's fault. 23 MR. HAHN: That's technology's fault and that's just 24 something we'll have to understand and deal with as we move

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forward in the litigation.

THE COURT: So where is Mr. Farrier going to put his documents, in what warehouse, where is that going?

MS. OLIVER: Judge, if I may, Alyson Oliver on behalf of plaintiffs. We've already worked out CMO-3, which this is contained within. Everybody agreed to it.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. OLIVER: Documents are going to be put on a hard drive, they get to choose what sort of hard drive they want to use, they can use DVDs, they can use whatever they want to use. They give it to us, we copy it, and we have two copies. So it's already been resolved.

THE COURT: So you're okay with that? You're okay with that procedure?

MR. SMITH: Yes, Judge, Alyson is right. And then once we give a set of the documents, then they can decide if they want to load them into databases, if they want to load them into two separate databases or what they want to do. But we'll produce the documents, they'll be Bates numbered, they'll have the same Bates numbers on the documents go to both plaintiffs' parties, and work it out from there.

THE COURT: That's all everybody cares, we're all singing from the same hymnal, right?

MR. HAHN: Right.

MR. BRYSON: Certainly, Your Honor. And I'll put it on the record; I think to a large extent it behooves the

owners' group and the contractors' group to work together on reviewing documents and things of that nature, and we'll make efforts at that in the future.

Back to the fundamental issue though, that's raised on page two, Section D, master written discovery, what we propose is that — and would like, is that each side have a set of discovery they can serve. We would serve our set of discovery, our master set of production, by next Friday. Not this Friday, but the next Friday. And then the contractors could look at it and decide what additional questions they think they need to prove their case on the types of documents they need on behalf of the contractors, and then would serve a request after that.

We have negotiated with MI, and we have agreed, we thought we really needed 50, but we've agreed with 35 original requests and 25 supplemental requests. And that's -- we agree to do that, assuming we can serve our own set of discovery. So the pink language that you see there is our agreement to tone down the number we originally wanted, if we can just serve -- get our discovery served.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, our interest is consistency, and one of the things we're trying to do with these CMOs is anticipate and resolve problems that we know are apparent right now. Our request is that we have a master set of discovery from the plaintiffs, regardless of which faction

gets which share of that, and that we respond to that. And that way we have overall consistency with all the privilege logs, with our responses.

You know, I don't know where the two PSCs are in terms of their ability to manage that, but we don't want to have to referee that from our standpoint. And I also think that at the end of the day there are common interests between the two PSCs that would be served by a common set of discovery. So the numbers, the number is fine. And we just ask that it be coordinated and consolidated by the two PSCs.

MR. HAHN: I just want clarification. I think
Mr. Bryson said is the number 35 for him and 25 supplementals
for them, so a total of 70 and 50.

MR. FARRIER: That's not what we agreed to. We agreed to a total of 35/25.

MR. BRYSON: I think that's -- this is the discovery for the ten states we have and the things that we feel like we have to prove, we need 35, which we don't think is burdensome, and we're prepared to propound that by next Friday.

THE COURT: So your take is 35 for the homeowners plaintiffs and 25 supplemental perhaps served a week from Friday. And then after Mr. Hahn takes a look at it, for him to serve whatever additional requests he wants with regard to the individual issues as to his clients. Is that --

MR. BRYSON: That's correct. And he's able to get

all the documents they produce, of course, to us, he would get as well. Then that gives -- that serves MI's purpose of not having Mr. Hahn maybe do the entire duplicate set, that his set would not -- he would not have to do that until after he looks at our set, which we think is reasonable.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, I thought we had a pretty clear agreement, contingent on coordination between the two on the numbers. We started out at 20, we went up to 25 total.

I'm sorry, our agreement was for 35 total as between both PSCs. In a much more complicated case and a much larger entity in Bausch and Lomb, the Court limited it to 50.

One of the things the Court is to do in this process, I'd point the Court to 11.451 of the Manual, is to decide -- excuse me -- but it is to manage the overall number, which, by the way, would be a starting point. If that is insufficient, then anyone can come to the Court and ask for additional. But 35 and 25 should be sufficient.

THE COURT: Okay. Of course, having gone through Bausch and Lomb, it is not more complicated than this, it's much less complicated than this, okay? One defendant, you know.

MR. FARRIER: I think it's fair to say that one of the major distinctions is there is little comparison between the size and complexity of the defendant in that case versus this.

THE COURT: And so whenever lawyers say agreement, I mean, Mr. Hahn, did you agree with this or did you not agree with this; I don't know.

MR. HAHN: We met this morning, Judge. I raised this issue over how many do I get? And there was no clear answer to that, so I can't agree to it until I understand.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, the real problem here is the solution that's being proposed, and this is -- I am conflating these two positions -- is in order to avoid a consolidated discovery, both sides want to be able to do whatever they want. And I don't think that's a very fair and equitable solution as to the defendant.

The idea of the MDL, which we resisted, and was being sought by the plaintiffs, is to have a consolidated discovery process. And the fact that we're going to have enough, we're going to have enough of everything, depositions, requests for production, interrogatories for both sides to do anything they want to independently, I don't think is an effective solution.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, as a last comment, I don't want to do whatever we want on this, we're wanting to, again, based on the Court's rulings on motions to dismiss, we're willing to have discovery requests that would encompass what we need to prove, or each of the attorneys need to prove in their various states to establish their causes of action. And we want to have those requests. We think 35 is a reasonable

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number. I provided those to Mr. Hahn. To the extent, you know, he may agree, he may have you not ask A, B, C, D, E, F and G, and then he'll add to it. My guess would be he won't have that many to add, but I don't know, he may. And then just serve them on MI.

THE COURT: Well, the question, my question is then, the quote unquote "agreement," the quote unquote "agreement" was that you get 35 supplementary requests on behalf of the homeowners, then Mr. Hahn gets some indefinite number of requests on behalf of his clients, and then Mr. Farrier's take on it is 35 total. So I mean, it doesn't seem to be an agreement to me.

MR. BRYSON: There's not. That's why I said we agreed to this number based on us being able to serve that number. And then there was no -- Right, there was no agreement. That number of 35 and 25 would be for plaintiffs, if we can serve discovery ourselves.

MS. LUMPKIN: Your Honor, if I may?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. LUMPKIN: Carol Lumpkin on behalf of MI. One of the things we're struggling with from the defense side is that when we were in front of the JPML, we suggested coordinated discovery amongst the plaintiffs. And that was absolutely objected to by the plaintiffs, they thought it would be insufficient, it would not be appropriate, so they insisted on

consolidation.

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Now we're here, we're into our second MDL hearing, and frankly, the defendants find themselves in a very unusual position to be in between the two plaintiff groups with regard to the process.

Frankly, we have had many negotiations, and this has been ongoing since our hearing in front of Your Honor on July 12. But Mr. Hahn is correct about one thing. I mean, he's not participated in many of the attempts to try to move this case forward. I can't speak as to why, but the reality is, a perfect example is the number of depositions. We did agree, we tried to work and cooperate and come up with a number. But if that number is going to be selected only by the homeowner group, then of course the builder group is going to insist that they have their own number. Meanwhile, the defendants in the middle are going, you know, you can't disrupt an ongoing business this way. Pick what you want. And presumably the plaintiffs, and especially Mr. Lucey, who back in May was very adamant about how much information he already has with regard to this defendant, frankly, if they have that much information, and as he, you know, said on the record, he has 90 percent of what he needs, he's really just looking for R&D; presumably they could provide one set of discovery amongst both plaintiff groups, that the defendant could start working on.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, I think we are as a group.

And it's a little embarrassing, we just want to send some document requests and interrogatories to MI. And I guess Mr. Hahn does, too, on behalf of his clients. We think it's easier, they're a separate — the contractor, the homeowner, the manufacturer. We send a set, they send a set, you know, we could send a set that says homeowners and contractor set of document requests, and he could delineate in that document which ones are his specific interrogatories and which ones are his specific document requests.

Everybody gets access to all the information. We're really, I guess, talking about a numbering issue; how many, more than anything. You know, quite candidly, we prepared, we're well along on preparing our master set of document requests and interrogatories, and that's why we want that number.

With regard to Miss Lumpkin's comments about what

Mr. Lucey has, you know, I haven't seen it. I haven't looked

at it. None of the other plaintiffs have looked at it,

because we think there's a confidentiality order out there on

that these guys have argued about. I haven't seen any of

those documents. I hope the day comes when we can see those

documents, but that's for another day, I guess, when things

are produced.

THE COURT: Okay. And it may be in here and we

haven't gotten to it yet; do you contemplate sending Mr. Hahn 1 2 discovery, and Mr. Hahn sending you discovery? 3 MR. BRYSON: That is not contemplated in this 4 document, based on how the evidence developed, but he could. 5 THE COURT: I'm talking about in the philosophical 6 sense, how about that? 7 MR. BRYSON: It could happen. If --8 MR. LUCEY: It may, in part, turn on the motion for 9 joinder tomorrow morning, and our position as parties in this 10 case. 11 MR. HAHN: Judge, I can't imagine that that would 12 happen. It would destroy all commonality issues that they 13 have for their class. So --14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. HAHN: -- I see that as a very remote 16 possibility. But we're happy to do whatever the Court wants 17 to do. All this would be alleviated if the two plaintiff 18 groups would just work together on a set of interrogatories. 19 THE COURT: Now, and Mr. Farrier says it would all be 20 alleviated if the two plaintiffs groups would work together to 21 limit themselves to 35 interrogatories. 22 MR. HAHN: Yes. 23 MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, the larger -- from our 24 perspective, the larger issue is what's reasonable at this

stage of the game. The discovery is going to have the same

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utility to both parties, once it comes out of us. And so the idea of having multiple sets of discovery, there's not a real, I think, defensible rationale for that happening. So the question really is twofold. One, what's the number. I thought we reached an agreement on a number, at least with the homeowners group. And second of all, whether the plaintiffs' factions are going to work together, as is contemplated, or they're going to go off and do things separately.

THE COURT: But you agree, I think you did, in the prior hearing, that there are different issues with regard to the contractors, since your defense is pointing the finger at them, right?

MR. FARRIER: Absolutely. But there's -- I think that the two parties could use the same document for different purposes, but the document is the document. We have produced it. And it's going to be processed, hopefully, in as few sessions as possible.

So I guess, Your Honor, if the question — and we'll — Mr. Bryson talked about an agreement. The agreement's really sort of perspective on our working together and finalizing some dates, which we think we can do in the next couple days. So I think that what is going to have to be decided with the Court is what's the number, and whether the process of discovery is going to be bifurcated between the PSCs or it's going to be consolidated. We much prefer that it be

consolidated. And coordinated.

THE COURT: Mr. Bryson, the quote unquote "agreement," at least the changes in red, contemplates 35 original requests and then 25 supplemental requests.

MR. BRYSON: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And 25 supplemental requests is -- you don't know whether they're going to use those or not right now, right?

MR. BRYSON: That's if you're in a deposition and a witness makes reference to a document or a file that we hadn't asked for before, that's the thought on that. You know, it comes up a lot with engineers, there's a file that's inadvertently not been produced, or there's an article that hasn't been produced. You know, you ask that that be produced to you, but sometimes it's not. And so — or sometimes you learn issues or topics that you file supplement requests for, which is, as you know, pretty common.

THE COURT: Okay. I think we'll start one step at a time. We'll limit it to 35 original requests from both parties. If Mr. Hahn thinks that he needs something else, a request, he can apply to me, but I need to know XYZ, whatever they are, okay?

MR. HAHN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: So that's the good way to start, all right?

MR. BRYSON: So we produce our master set and then have that for plaintiffs, then send it to Mr. Hahn to review to see what additional --

THE COURT: Sure. You're going to file it in the case, and I guess you're not going to file discovery, but you send a copy to Mr. Hahn and Mr. Hahn takes a look at it and say, I need XYZ, and if he wants XYZ, he sends me a letter, and you can object or agree or whatever; how's that sound?

Just gets it off the snide, as they say.

MR. FARRIER: Just so I'm clear, if a week is the time that we ultimately agree on that we're going to get this master set.

THE COURT: Week from Friday.

MR. FARRIER: Week from Friday. That's going to be processed by both Mr. Hahn's client and Mr. Bryson's client. That's going to be that master set.

THE COURT: That's the way you think about it?

MR BRYSON: I would prefer that we have the

MR. BRYSON: I would prefer that we have the plaintiffs' set. We can serve it as a joint document, and then if Mr. Hahn has any requests he wants to add, he would delineate those contractors' interrogatories or document requests, and then we would submit that. We would serve that then as a single master set.

THE COURT: How's that? Is that what you want?

MR. FARRIER: If that's what I just said, then I

think that's right. 1 2 THE COURT: Don't reverse yourself. If you do that, 3 you get in trouble. 4 MR. BRYSON: We just want to make sure we keep some 5 sort of delineation because of these conflicts and things. 6 THE COURT: So there's a master set, and then Mr. 7 Hahn can make any requests that he wants with regard to his 8 contractors, as a supplemental request based on what you've 9 asked. 10 MR. BRYSON: Right. 11 THE COURT: He'll need to see yours before he makes a 12 decision. 13 MR. BRYSON: Absolutely. And it would be so 14 designated in our set that this is the contractors' additional 15 questions. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. FARRIER: That set that we get, the initial --18 the 35 is going to contain both what the homeowners and the 19 contractors want from us? That's what I'm hearing. 20 MR. BRYSON: That's correct. You won. That's what 21 we're doing. But if then the judge said, if Mr. Hahn thinks 22 that there's additional ones that he needs, he would apply to 23 the Court for that.

THE COURT: Everybody got that?

MR. FARRIER: That's fine.

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MR. HAHN: Yes.

THE COURT: Can somebody put that in English in the order? Okay. Gotcha.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, the next --

THE COURT: All right, we're skipping over the yellow at the top of the page two, and inspections of defendant's manufacturing plants, I don't know whether that's a controversy. There's no footnote there, so I don't know what that means.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, it ties into Section E under document production. What's contemplated, and this was a contractor addition, that following entry of this order, that there be a meeting to talk about production of documents, things of that nature. We don't think that's necessary, and we'd like to proceed with immediately serving the discovery requests. We have the ESI order, et cetera. However, we're negotiating with MI and the contractors' group on this particular provision. And we'd ask that you hold this portion of the order open until tomorrow morning on the status conference, because we think we may have an agreement on a custodial production of documents and things like that, that tie into the ESI, that we're still talking about. And if Your Honor is okay with that —

THE COURT: Fine with me.

MR. BRYSON: -- we can hold a status conference on

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this tomorrow morning.
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               THE COURT: That's paragraph E?
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               MR. BRYSON: That's correct.
               MR. FARRIER: That's fine, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Great.
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               MR. BRYSON: The next thing, Your Honor, is Section
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      G, duration of the examinations. And I think that we -- with
      the purple language, we may have had a breakthrough there.
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      Our concern was that at seven hours there be a technical or an
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      engineer or an expert that has a lot of information, we get to
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      Pennsylvania or wherever, and you know, it's 5:00 o'clock and
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      it's like, We're done. And I think we have got some language
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      that I think alleviates our concerns, MI can live with, so I
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      think that G is pretty much agreed to.
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               MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, I think that G -- my read
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      of it is it's consistent with the Federal Rules, that there's
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      a presumptive limitation. If they need to go over for an
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     hour, they're going to ask us, and we'll say yea or nay. If
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      there's a problem, somebody -- you're going to get a call.
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               THE COURT: That's fine.
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               MR. HAHN: We can live with that, Judge.
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               THE COURT: Sounds good.
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               MR. BRYSON: We've agreed, we've agreed to a number
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      of depositions. The 25, speeding right along, I think now you
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      go --
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MR. FARRIER: I think that's it.

MR. BRYSON: I think there was an issue -- there was some language we added in under Section C, and this bears some mentioning. It's just coordination. If there are separate State Court actions, we changed the language on that, you can see the red, bring it to the Court's attention. The parties will negotiate coordination of discovery with State Court actions when and if the situation arises, and submit a separate CMO on this issue. I think there is already a separate state action that's been filed. We probably need to, at the status conference, report on that actually, as to what that action is, make sure the Court's aware.

THE COURT: Have we got some State Court actions?

MR. FARRIER: A Jeff Leaf has filed a lawsuit, I
think in York County.

THE COURT: I can squash him, and will. All right.

So if you can -- and I think this worked pretty successfully,

Mr. Hahn, that if you can identify State Court actions and

State Court judges -- of course, I don't know whether this

is -- in South Carolina the judges rotate, so -- but I'd be

glad to reach out and call the State Court judges. And we had

coordinated with State Court and Federal Court hearings, and

try to get it so -- for everybody's purposes, we're all in the

same boat. And so if you just identify them and let me know

who they are, you know, sometimes they're -- State Court

judges are great, sometimes they blow me off, but I don't care.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, we'll provide that in an e-mail, the contact information, it's a large number, et cetera.

MR. BRYSON: And what was addressed in this discovery order is, you know, just making sure there was a process that protects us, that attorney may reach out to us, wanting documents we've got, they may send the document requests, discovery requests to MI, and that's something that will probably need to be dealt with sooner than later, if that attorney — if their action is not stayed or perhaps put on the back burner. But I'm sure they'll probably be wanting to proceed with discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah.

MR. HAHN: Can we go back to E?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HAHN: I didn't understand we had an agreement. Y'all had this sort of -- what are --

MR. FARRIER: I don't think we have. My understanding from discussions with you and with the other PSC, is that we have conceptual agreement, more fully articulated, frankly, with the contractor plaintiffs about the sequence and timing of discovery. Mr. Bryson has talked about that.

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THE COURT: I think y'all said you're going to continue to talk about it, and we'll address it in the morning. MR. BRYSON: It's Mr. Hahn's proposal on this, but we're wanting to know more about it before we would agree to it. THE COURT: So --MR. HAHN: We're all meeting after this? MR. FARRIER: Correct. MR. HAHN: That's what I need to know, Judge. THE COURT: So we're not going to address this till tomorrow? 13 MR. HAHN: Apparently. THE COURT: Okay. MR. BRYSON: Judge, that's it on the CMOs. THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. BRYSON: And we'll get a revised version submitted to you based on where we end up with --19 THE COURT: Bring it to me in the morning, make sure everybody has read it, and we'll go with it and go from there, okay? Okay. MR. LUCEY: Your Honor, the last one is CMO-4, and 23 we've submitted some papers to you. Mr. Gupta with our PSC would like to address Your Honor with regard to that proposed 25 CMO. He's with Mr. Richard Arsenault's office.

MR. GUPTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor, Srivatsa Gupta for the plaintiffs.

2.2.

You know, I was really moved by Mr. Farrier's earlier words that one of the things we're trying to do here is anticipate and resolve issues that may arise in the litigation. And that's exactly what this CMO that we've proposed is designed to do.

I understand that defendants have a philosophical objection and, you know, they believe that this kind of order is unnecessary and superfluous. I would maintain that it's not.

You know, and I apologize to the --

THE COURT: Unless he's not going to assert any privileges, then it probably is.

MR. GUPTA: Maybe then I believe the other word he used was premature, and that may more accurately characterize the defendant's feelings.

You know, I apologize to the Court for submitting the lengthy supplement background material, and I hope that the Court had the time to review it.

THE COURT: I read Professor Rice's report with great interest.

MR. GUPTA: Well, then, Your Honor, you saw the issue that arose in Vioxx where the plaintiffs and the defendants had differing views on whether documents were privileged. And

His Honor, Eldon Fallon, from the Eastern District of
Louisiana, reviewed, had something like 80 boxes of documents
for in camera review, and decided that of the 8000, only about
500 were actually privileged. And that the defendants were
not happy with this ruling, and filed a Writ of Mandamus to
the Fifth Circuit, who suggested but did not order that a
representative selection of the documents needed to be
re-reviewed.

You know, in that case a special master was hired to handle that situation, at great cost, on the order of half a million dollars. And so since that experience, you know, plaintiffs have been trying to put in an order in advance, to avoid that kind of scenario in the future. The proposed order we provided the Court is the result of negotiations and other MDLs with sophisticated defendants and sophisticated defense counsel. It's not a plaintiffs' wish list. We're not trying to put one over on the defendants; we think it's an accurate statement of the law of privilege and what is necessary to assert it.

You know, it's our position that by dealing with this now, the defendants will be able to know specifically which elements they need to put into a privilege log in order not to inadvertently waive privilege.

I know Mr. Smith represented in the ESI negotiations that defendants do not plan on waiving any privileges. And, you

know, as is well settled in the Fourth Circuit, the penalty for an insufficient privilege log is a waiver of that privilege.

So all we're trying to do is put into writing exactly what's necessary to avoid an impasse in the future.

Thank you.

MR. FARRIER: I have a little packet that will be assembled for you in a moment, Your Honor.

You know, our problem with -- we've got some specific problems with case management order number four as proposed.

But I want to talk about the overall problem. And our overall problem really is not one of convenience and not one of really anticipation, but is a constitutional problem.

There's a distinction between choice of law between state law, which would govern the issue of privilege, and federal law. And, in fact, if you look at the history of Judge Fallon and some of the orders that were passed up, you can see exactly how that played out. Because Judge Fallon originally, after an extensive discovery dispute in Vioxx, issued a very lengthy order, just like the one that's been submitted to the Court.

And what he tried to do was anticipate problems, and short-circuit those problems by saying that we're going to adopt a federal body of common law that we're going to apply to these privilege issues as they come up in the case. That

caused him to personally review these 20,000 or so documents, and to make judgments under those documents.

Based on that original ruling in his CMO, similar to CMO-4, if you look at the first page of the proposed CMO-4, under Roman two, you'll see a statement, "The parties have agreed that federal common law governing privilege applies, including the general and specific principles set forth in In Re: Vioxx Products Liability."

(Brief interruption in proceedings.)

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, first thing I'd like to direct you to is U.S. In Re: Vioxx, March 6, 2007, which is 2007 Westlaw 854251. And even Judge Fallon at the time recognizes this overall principle that I just noted to you on page two under Roman three A, although state law applies to Merck's attorney-client privilege, the Work Product Doctrine, as a matter of federal law -- this order, by the way, merges those two doctrines -- the Work Product Doctrine is distinct from, broader than the attorney-client privilege.

He goes on to create the same compromise standard that's being proposed to you in this proposed CMO-4. And that is set forth in 501 F.Supp. 789. That's the In Re: Vioxx opinion. On page five under Roman two, accordingly, the Court will now reproduce the substantive portion of special master's report, and goes on to set forth this federal standard in the carryover page; the same one that's being proposed here.

The next opinion is the Fifth Circuit's review of this process.

THE COURT: Is that what you supposedly gave me?

MR. FARRIER: I thought it was.

2.2.

THE COURT: What I've got is Chinese Manufactured Drywall, Yaz and Caremark Health.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, I'll provide copies of this. I don't want to hold things up, but I'll get them to everyone today.

THE COURT: That's fine, my clerks have already memorized those, so that's all right.

MR. FARRIER: And the Court addresses Judge Fallon's approach, the Fifth Circuit. And without quoting it, it says that while this is expedient, it violates constitutional principles. That ultimately the Court is going to have to deal with state privilege issues by each state's law. And that the idea of supplanting the law with a compromised federal standard is inappropriate. The one case that I did send you, the In Re: Yasmin and Yaz, discusses this same issue.

So, Your Honor, as these privilege issues are going to arise, assuming they do, we're going to have to look at the brief and discuss those according to the state in which they arise. That state's law is going to determine choice of law, and it's going to determine the privilege issue. And there's

no way to shortcut that, as this order attempts to do.

There are a couple of other things that I would, just in flipping through this, I'd like to point out. In the proposed order under A, general principles, you have a set of standards, the attorney-client privilege applies if -- and this is the Vioxx standard, this is the compromise standard adopted in Vioxx, and the one that was ultimately rejected.

There are other issues in here that are specific to this case, that we raised when we discussed CMO-4. There's a portion of this that deals with redaction of confidential, irrelevant and privileged information. We already have a local rule that addresses that, which is the ECF Rule 13.4.3. This is either redundant, or in some cases inconsistent with the local rule on this issue. So there's no need for this.

And finally, under privilege dispute procedure, we're not amenable to agreeing that if we don't specifically follow this privilege dispute procedure, we will be deemed to have waived the attorney-client privilege.

What we would propose, Your Honor, if the Court -- first of all, we don't think an order is necessary. We think we're going to have to address attorney-client privileges as we move along. We don't know what that's going to look like. We don't think we can anticipate and circumscribe how we're going to claim a privilege in a specific state. But as those issues arise, the Court will have to deal with them. There's a body

of federal and state law which governs that, and it shouldn't be modified for the sake of having a compromised standard.

What we had drafted but had not submitted to the Court was a very short order. What I handed up was Judge Fallon's more recent order, which is a four-page order, which sets forth some general standards. And if the Court believes an order is necessary to cover the scope, as anticipated in the CMO-4, we don't think it's necessary, but if the Court believes one is, then we're prepared to submit an order in line with Judge Fallon's more recent order.

THE COURT: Okay. Assuming for the purposes of this that -- We're going to get to privilege, everybody knows that. It would probably help everybody in the litigation at least to agree on what has been identified in the privilege log.

Because I think in every state, no matter if there's a privilege asserted, you have to submit a privilege log, and the information on the privilege log is the starting point for any analysis. And in my experience, the paucity of information or the incorrect information on a privilege log makes everybody's job a lot harder. I don't really care about making your job a lot harder, but I care about making my job a lot harder a lot.

Yes, ma'am.

MS. LUMPKIN: Well, I have a request for clarification on that, Your Honor. Are you addressing with

Mr. Farrier whether we should have some type of protocol on the privilege logs that will be produced in this case, by state? Will it be by state, how are you looking to state law on the privilege issue, or do you want a protocol that's just going to be more general, understanding that within that, we'd look to the state law with regard to the privilege issue?

THE COURT: Yes, sir?

MR. LUCEY: Plaintiffs would submit that's getting more complicated than necessary. And if I may approach the bench and hand up to the bench, there actually has been one privilege log produced in this case by MI. I believe the Court will agree that it was very inadequate and doesn't address any of the issues necessary for plaintiffs to adequately determine the privilege they asserted, and whether or not it can be challenged. So the point of that is we're here now, we already have the privilege problem.

If I might suggest to the Court to shortcut this, it seems as though the principles set forth in Vioxx are well put and well said and generally applicable. And to the extent that they quoted the constitutional issue correctly, and I don't have a copy of the case in front of me, I might suggest that we could go with the attorney-client privilege and Work Product Doctrine order, with a safe harbor caveat. And the safe harbor caveat would reserve to any party that finds a material difference in state law that's applicable to their

claim of privilege, reserves to that party the right to bring it to the Court's attention. So we're not actually establishing a federal common law as to privilege, we're establishing a set of case management principles, which any party can ask for variance of, if they can show a material variance in state law.

MS. LUMPKIN: Your Honor, if I may follow up on that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. LUMPKIN: As to the Johnson privilege log that pertains to Johnson, it's before this MDL even, you know -- as a matter of fact, I don't even know it's on there, because we're not counsel, we weren't counsel in Johnson. But we certainly understand the need going forward for some type of protocol, and we certainly would be happy to work through that.

When this was first proposed to us, we want to thank plaintiffs' counsel, because they were very helpful in providing some samples, which is what was attached to the CMO-4 that was filed yesterday. The reason we objected is primarily not only because, as Mr. Farrier has pointed out, there's just misstatements of the law within the proposed CMO, but also because it is premature. None of the cases that are attached to the CMO-4 proposed by the plaintiffs had this type of order entered in the inception. As a matter of fact, in Vioxx, 2.3 million documents had already been produced, and

there was a 30,000 document privilege log that the judge had gone through and that had been presented to the Court, there are numerous motions to compel. The same with the Avandia case. In the Avandia case there was a seventh R and R from a Magistrate Judge before the Court went through this analysis. Because, frankly, it is a painful analysis when you're dealing with State Court actions that are part of an MDL.

When the Fifth Circuit went back on the Vioxx case and sent it back to Judge Fallon, one of the things the Circuit pointed out is MDLs, while consolidation is intended to be beneficial and create some kind of efficiency, it's not a process that doesn't have tremendous strains with it. And this privilege analysis is one of them.

So one of the things that we point out is that it is somewhat premature now. And the reason we provided the Court with Judge Fallon's latest and most recent opinion in Drywall, is because I think Judge Fallon himself, after going through the analysis in In Re: Vioxx back in 2007, and after going back up to the Fifth and coming back down, I think Judge Fallon realized that a four-page order might be more in order with regard to this type of issue in a case such as an MDL like this.

Avandia, Pinnacle, Actos, all of those cases that are attached as samples, were MDLs where these types of orders were entered, but after numerous discovery disputes, after

millions of documents, all within the context of pharma cases or medical devices where you had, you know, wrongful death, you had all kinds of issues, highly regulated type of industry, where the privilege or work product was certainly going to be scrutinized by a Court. We've got leaky windows, if at all.

So it is somewhat premature. And while we recognize that there may be a need going forward, we really believe that something as, frankly, the CMO proposed would have to be revised substantially, but we would think something more akin to what Judge Fallon has now entered in Drywall would be appropriate in this case.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. GUPTA: Your Honor, I'd just like to state two quick corrections. In the Actos case, the order was entered before the commencement of discovery, for the commencement of written discovery. And in the Pinnacle it was entered before written discovery, but much of that discovery had already been produced in a similar case, and it was just cross noticed.

You know, what I'm hearing from the defendants is a little different than what they gave us in their letter yesterday or to the Court, which was a philosophical objection. Here, they've got specific examples of what's wrong with the order. And, you know, we provided a copy of this to the defendants about a month ago. And we had a meet and confer where we

asked them specifically for problems they had, examples of misstatements of the law or corrections that may apply, and we got zero response.

We're happy to negotiate this order. You know, if there are misstatements of the law, it's my understanding that MI Windows is a California corporation with a principal place of business in Pennsylvania. I'm sure they have operations in other states; I'm sure they don't have operations in every state. You know, both the plaintiffs and defendants just briefed and argued ten different state laws this week. You know, I'm sure we can find the applicable privileges and set out what the law is, if the defendants are willing.

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am?

MS. LUMPKIN: In the Yasmin case that Mr. Farrier handed up, the Court took it upon itself to go through the Vioxx case and explain why the Vioxx approach was not the appropriate approach, given what the laws require and 501, FRA 501 requires.

There is -- it's pretty established law that if the claims arising in an MDL come from state claims, state law applies to the privilege. And there's a big difference between -- obviously Your Honor is aware of -- between the immunity, the doctrine, and the privilege issue. The doctrine, the Work Product Doctrine, certainly can be addressed through federal law. But the privilege issue has to be analyzed under a

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choice of law, and then privilege law within the state, which is why this seems a bit premature at this inception of the case.

And I stand corrected, because I wasn't part of that litigation, so I'm sorry about that. I think there was like case management number six, a little further along than ours.

But having said that, one of the things that the judge analyzed in the Yasmin case is that he looked at and determined that there are three types of cases in an MDL. You have the cases filed directly to the MDL, you have the cases that have been transferred from another jurisdiction, which is what we have here, and you have the cases that originated outside the jurisdiction, and then become part of an MDL or filed with the MDL. And the judge went through very very specifically and, you know, methodically and analyzed why and when you have to apply state law and when you look to the federal law. If you have federal defenses or federal claims within the MDL, then you have to look to federal law. But in a case like this, which is based on diversity, the state claims would dictate. And depending on the jurisdiction that you're in and we're looking to, there's a different standard as to what choice of law. And I recognize it's burdensome and I recognize it's a painful process, but frankly, that's what the law requires. And the MDL does not excuse that.

THE COURT: All right. So I'll take a look at -- I

would encourage you to get together and try to negotiate at least some kind of procedure, especially with regard to identification of documents and privilege logs. I mean, that's the starting point in any analysis of privilege, is if you assert privilege, then you put a privilege log, and a privilege log ought to have enough information for someone to be able to look at it and have a good idea what's in the document itself.

MS. LUMPKIN: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, that's -- I guess what -- We're fine with that. We think that the law requires us to, if we're going to claim privilege, to create a privilege log, to put information on there sufficient for the other side to understand what the document is, what the nature of the privilege is, why it's being asserted as to this document. For instance, why the distribution of the document that might cancel that.

I do think that there's a problem with, at this point, and we don't know what documents are, what sort of language is out there. But to the extent that the Court would be helped by having an order in place with some of that structure, we'll be glad to work with the other side towards that end.

THE COURT: All right. Yes, sir?

MR. GUPTA: I would just note that the Fourth Circuit
Interbake Foods case that's cited in the order does require a

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party who is using a privilege log to assert privilege, the log must, quote, "...as to each document, set forth specific facts that, if credited, would suffice to establish each element of the privilege or immunity that is claimed." MR. FARRIER: We'll do that. THE COURT: All right, thanks. MR. GUPTA: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: What else have we got this afternoon? Yes, sir, Mr. Hahn? MR. HAHN: Your Honor, this kind of goes back to what we were talking about earlier, the letter that Mr. Lucey handed up to the Court, this is the first time contractors have heard that a subpoena existed, much less that 2500 documents were produced on June 25th. We know nothing about any of this. And which highlights the issue that we're talking about, that we need a standard, Judge, so that we can see the documents as they're produced. THE COURT: All right. So --MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, I think on the agenda I was looking --THE COURT: So I guess maybe the answer to the question is why didn't other parties get a copy of the documents that were produced by the defendant in this case?

MR. LUCEY: Your Honor, I'll be happy to research

that. My memory is a subpoena was issued long before any of

these cases got MDL, and that this privilege log actually came after the documents. But this was only in — the subpoena was issued in Johnson, not in the MDL. And I am sure it predated it by many months. Johnson, of course, has been pending for several years.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HAHN: Judge, it's part of the MDL, Judge, and this clearly says, talks about the documents.

MR. BRYSON: I haven't seen them either, Your Honor, nor any of the attorneys in the other state, just pending these proceedings, so Mr. Hahn hasn't missed anything. I mean, those documents haven't been produced among the various plaintiffs. Can they?

MR. LUCEY: We're under a Johnson confidentiality agreement which I think is being broadened or has been broadened, but many times on the record MI has limited our ability to share with any other counsel until those matters are finalized.

MR. BRYSON: Can we see them now?

MR. HAHN: Mr. Ouzts is in the courtroom; maybe he can tell us.

MR. OUZTS: I don't have a perfect recollection of what happened, but these documents were not produced by MI directly, they were produced by a third party, independent third-party vendor, in response to a subpoena that was issued

in the Johnson case, directly to Fenestration Services, Inc. Fenestration Services hired an attorney to assist them in responding to the subpoena. The attorney requested and was granted at least one extension of time to respond to the subpoena, and maybe even more time; I'm not real clear on that.

And because there was a confidentiality provision in the contract between Fenestration Services and MI Windows, it was agreed between counsel for Nadine Johnson and counsel for MI Windows, that counsel for MI Windows would review the documents that had been selected by Fenestration Services for production, for the purpose of marking any documents that were privileged or confidential, which is how we ended up with the documents and reviewing them before they were produced to Mr. Lucey's firm. Now, where the MDL action stood at that point in time, I am not clear. I don't remember the dates. But those were the essential circumstances of the production.

THE COURT: So if I understand correctly, MI Windows does not have any objection for Mr. Lucey to turn over FEN-1 through 2466 to the other members of the homeowners or the contractors, is that right?

MR. OUZTS: No, Your Honor.

MS. LUMPKIN: No, Your Honor.

MR. OUZTS: And that was another issue in the case, the confidentiality order had not been entered as of that

time. They were produced with an understanding that plaintiffs' counsel would treat them as confidential under the proposed order. But we have no objection to those documents being supplied.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Lucey, you can feel free to share them with whoever you want to share them with.

MR. LUCEY: Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Hahn, you're now even with Mr. Bryson, you both will be able to read something on the way home.

MR. HAHN: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, as I look at the -- we have kind of two agendas, our agenda and MI's agenda. And some of the things that are on their agenda, home inspections, you know, on our agenda, protocol of inspection of homes; other one, inspection of factories, you know, things of that nature, I think that's where we're going to try to address in this continuing discussion that we're having that we'll resume with the Court tomorrow morning on perhaps rolling custodial document production, things of that nature. So I would ask that that be put off.

Looking at MI's agenda, I'm down then, I think, to number nine, which says joinder of Lakes of Summerville and Johnson, that's for tomorrow, correct?

THE COURT: Yes, that's tomorrow morning.

MR. HAHN: Yes, Your Honor, 2:00 o'clock?

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. BRYSON: Then looking at our agenda, I think this protocol for inspection, you know, we need to raise with MI as well, and I'm not sure this is on the agenda as part of it, preservation of evidence by the defendants with regard to windows, exemplars of windows, windows of these particular series that are at issue, making sure they don't destroy any of those, if they're in warehouses or manufacturing facilities, things like that, we want to address that with them. But it's kind of like a litigation hold kind of deal. But I don't envision problems with that, but just to bring that to the Court's attention, we're turning our attention to that.

We don't have anything else other than some thoughts we have about the next status conference.

MR. LUCEY: With the caveat that the scheduling item that we're dealing with, we have agreed to try to resolve by tomorrow the initial scheduling item. And the only one we care about for now is the lifting of the stay on discovery, which I think was timely. And either we're going to go to the rules and submit discovery, or we're going to have agreed to a rolling production with the defendants that we'll put on the record tomorrow. But that one last scheduling thing.

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THE COURT: So we'll take care of that tomorrow. We'll either decide it or agree on it by tomorrow, right? MR. BRYSON: That's correct. MR. HAHN: Judge, when do you want us here tomorrow for that issue? THE COURT: I don't know what the schedule is tomorrow. The first argument is 9:30, isn't that right? MR. HAHN: We're showing 9:00 o'clock, Your Honor, for DeBlaker motion to reconsider; 10:30 Hildebrand; and then 2:00 o'clock was the contractor. THE COURT: You want to come tomorrow morning and we'll just knock yours out when everything is over with, rather than come tomorrow afternoon? You'll be here anyway. MR. BRYSON: I envision tomorrow will go pretty swiftly as well. THE COURT: Why don't you come tomorrow morning. You want to be here anyway, so we'll argue it when we get everything else done. MR. BRYSON: We're starting at 9:30 or 9:00? THE COURT: 9:00 o'clock. MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, the last thing, with regard to the next status conference, if we understood Your Honor correctly, the only time you had in November would have been that last week in November?

THE COURT: I mean, I've got Thanksgiving week, but

nobody wants to do it Thanksgiving week. If you want to do it Thanksgiving week, I'm close to home, we'll have it here, but you can explain to your families. So I was thinking maybe — I've checked on the trial for the first two weeks in November, it's still going forward, it's a huge terrible case that Mr. Farrier's ex-partner, if he gets squashed, he's really going to get squashed in this one. But so when I said the 27th, that's a Tuesday, so everybody doesn't have to travel Sunday, so that's fine, and we can do it anywhere you want to do it.

MR. BRYSON: Here's our proposal, Your Honor. We propose the status conference be on November 29th in New Orleans. And the reason for that would be, on the 30th there is a seminar, the Louisiana State Bar Association has a seminar on complex litigation. I understand it would be the twelfth annual complex litigation seminar. Speaking at that seminar are a number of MDL judges, Judge Fallon and some others. Mr. Gupta can address it, his firm is very involved with it; a number of defense firms are involved as well.

And I believe that -- not I believe -- I know that

Mr. Gupta's firm, he's involved with that seminar, would like
to extend an invitation to Your Honor to speak on the 30th at
this seminar on a panel with Judge Fallon and a couple other

MDL judges. And also invite K&L Gates; there are some other
slots open, and I'd invite K&L Gates to speak at the seminar.

So that there would be the status conference on the 29th, the Louisiana seminar involving complex litigation would be on the 30th, and then that way for everyone involved they could maybe do a little CLE, see New Orleans a little bit, those that wanted to go a little bit superfluous. But our proposal would be for the status conference to be on the 29th.

I'd ask Mr. Gupta to provide a bit more information about it. We have forwarded an e-mail to K&L Gates giving them information about the seminar, so they can see it's not a seminar that's -- you know, it's a balanced seminar. And certainly the plaintiffs, we would agree, if they speak at it or I'm scheduled to speak at it, no one is going to be subpoenaing the other and using it as evidence in this trial, it's just a seminar. But I think what's particularly interesting are a number of the other MDL judges who would be speaking at this.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FARRIER: Your Honor, that's an issue that sounds like a lot of fun. I love New Orleans. I just got back from a wedding with a couple of my daughters. It does present an expense to the client that, I mean, I really don't feel comfortable consenting to taking a small army to New Orleans. And frankly, I hate to deprive the Court of an opportunity to speak at the seminar, or maybe one of us, but it is — I think it would be a fairly significant expense. It's something we'd

have to look into.

THE COURT: Of course, the expense, there's also these folks over here who have had to undergo the expense to come to Charleston several times, and I think it's only fair to go to wherever some of these folks are. I mean, I think New Orleans is probably nicer in late November than Chicago is, not denigrating anything. You can deal without a small army, just have a tiny army.

I guess it would depend upon what's being discussed and how substantive everything is going to be and all that. I mean, you know that in the long run, but I don't have any problem, I don't know about speaking, because I'm supposed to -- again, I'm supposed to be in Chicago -- the 29th -- 27th is a Tuesday, 29th is a Thursday, I guess?

MR. GUPTA: That's correct.

THE COURT: I have to go to Chicago on Friday because my wife's working in Chicago that weekend and it's her birthday that weekend, so I may not be able to stay for the seminar, but I'd like to stay for the seminar personally. But I'll cross that bridge when we come to it.

So right now tentatively why don't we set it for the 29th in New Orleans. And we can discuss whatever matters are pending at that time. All right?

MR. GUPTA: Your Honor, my firm would be happy to coordinate any matters that need to take place for us to have

that status conference there.

THE COURT: And if you can send us some information with regard to that seminar, if I --

MR. GUPTA: We'd be happy to, sir.

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, should Mr. Gupta perhaps coordinate with someone on the Federal Court staff to make sure the courtroom availability, things of that nature?

THE COURT: I'll talk to Judge Fallon or I'll get a courtroom available. We'll call down there.

MR. BRYSON: Let us know.

MR. GUPTA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. HAHN: One other quick matter, Your Honor, since we're all here. There was an issue with confidentiality of some additional documents that Mr. Lucey has. And since everybody is here, will MI waive that confidentiality so he can produce those to the PSC as well?

THE COURT: You mean the ones he subpoenaed himself?
MR. HAHN: Yes, sir.

MS. LUMPKIN: Your Honor, we can't agree to that.

One, because there was a reason there was a confidentiality in place. Two, and a return, part of it was a return of the documents. Two, we were not counsel of record on that case; we need to know what was provided to Mr. Lucey and have the client go through that. We don't know what Mr. Lucey has in his possession, because we weren't counsel of record, we don't

know.

MR. LUCEY: Mr. Ouzts' firm was counsel of record, so they were all Bates stamped and recorded, so they do, in fact, know what I have, first. Second, I believe if we clarify some wording, I don't think Mr. Hahn's requesting a release of confidentiality as to the documents generally, he's requesting we confirm that he's allowed to see them under the existing confidentiality agreement. As I understand it, they've already consented for those documents to be under that confidentiality agreement. I'm bound by it. And since we have a global confidentiality agreement, I can now share those with Mr. Hahn. And just lastly, make sure the record's absolutely clear, some of those documents — in fact, maybe perhaps most of them, are not stamped confidential and are not confidential. They were either stamped at the time or not. We have simply kept them as one group of documents.

MS. LUMPKIN: Well, Your Honor, that goes to the heart of the issue. We weren't counsel of record, we don't know if things were properly marked confidential. I think the client has a right to determine whether --

THE COURT: I don't think you get two bites at that apple.

MS. LUMPKIN: But, Your Honor, it's not the same case, and there's a case where there's an agreement between counsel that are not present, because Mr. Ouzts was not

involved in that case.

THE COURT: Well, he just said that Mr. Ouzts' firm was involved in the case.

MS. LUMPKIN: The firm was, but Mr. Ouzts had nothing to do with that case. So my concern is we're -- One of the things that was agreed to in May on record by Mr. Lucey was that although he had subpoenaed the records, the documents back to him, as a way of getting around the agreement he had entered into with previous counsel, he would not be sharing that with other lawyers in this case and the MDL. That's on the record. If we're going to consider that, then we should be given the opportunity to review them.

MR. LUCEY: The only documents that had an obligation to return, that had to be subpoenaed, were the documents stamped confidential. And honestly, I couldn't tell you right now if ten percent of them are stamped or 90 percent of them are stamped. But at any rate, there are some stamped and there are some that are not stamped.

THE COURT: What about it, Mr. Ouzts?

MR. OUZTS: Your Honor, I'd have to look at the documents. I thought -- Well, the problem is that the documents were produced in a redacted form. We redacted privacy information, things like street addresses -- Oh, you're talking about the Tennyson Row documents?

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR. OUZTS: I was not involved in the Tennyson Row case. I really have no firsthand information about the circumstances of --THE COURT: Your firm was involved in the Tennyson Row case? MR. OUZTS: Yes, David Cobb was involved in it, but I personally was not involved in the Tennyson Row case. MS. LUMPKIN: Your Honor, may we be given the opportunity to review whatever the agreement is between Mr. Lucey --THE COURT: I assume we'd have to waive the confidentiality order so you can see them, right? MS. LUMPKIN: If that's the agreement between them regarding the return of documents, because I'm not sure that it only -- they only agreed to return confidential documents. I don't know that. MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, I don't get it. You know, in this case, this Johnson case is still part of this MDL. Documents have been produced, they had attorneys. Mr. -- to

MR. BRYSON: Your Honor, I don't get it. You know, in this case, this Johnson case is still part of this MDL.

Documents have been produced, they had attorneys. Mr. -- to

Mr. Lucey -- I'm sorry, in the Tennyson Row case, documents

were produced by MI, you had attorneys, MI had attorneys, you looked at the documents, he has the documents, I don't see why we can't get the documents now.

And I think Your Honor actually addressed this somewhat when they brought this up at our initial status conference,

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that you were hopeful that we would get the documents sooner rather than later. MS. LUMPKIN: My recollection of that is that the documents were raised, and we pointed out to the transcript from May, and nothing was addressed further than that. All we're suggesting is we're not saying the documents won't eventually make their way to plaintiffs, because frankly, if they're responsive and it eliminates MI's need for further expense, it would not be an issue. But we should have an opportunity to review what other counsel in a different State Court case agreed to. THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. Other counsel representing your client agrees to something; isn't your client bound by that? MS. LUMPKIN: Your Honor, yes --THE COURT: Mr. Cobb was your client's agent. MS. LUMPKIN: I recognize that may be the case. The reality is --THE COURT: What do you mean it may be the case? is the case, right? MS. LUMPKIN: But, Your Honor, Mr. Lucey entered into an agreement in that case with our client's counsel. THE COURT: It hasn't gone anywhere, and --

MS. LUMPKIN: That's why we'd like the opportunity to review with what that agreement is, and then at least have an

opportunity to know what was produced to Mr. Lucey. 1 2 MR. BRYSON: Don't you know what was produced? 3 MS. LUMPKIN: No, I don't. 4 MR. BRYSON: Did you ask Mr. Ouzts? 5 MS. LUMPKIN: Mr. Ouzts just said he wasn't 6 involved --7 THE COURT: You don't need to -- You know. It seems like that we're starting to pick at nits, which I understand 8 9 is important, but if your client, represented by a good lawyer 10 in Mr. Ouzts' firm, agreed to give documents to Mr. Lucey, 11 then you don't get another shot at that. You can't say, oops, 12 we made a mistake, on behalf of the same client. 13 MS. LUMPKIN: I understand, Your Honor, but obviously 14 counsel for MI in that case anticipated a need to enter into 15 an agreement with Mr. Lucey requesting that they return the 16 documents. I don't know why they did that, but there must 17 have been a need either from the client's perspective or 18 counsel's perspective. Let's get Mr. Cobb to come down here 19 and talk to us about it at the next status conference. 20 THE COURT: Okay. Bring him here tomorrow. Or talk 21 to him at least by tomorrow, all right? Okay. 22 Anything else? Thanks a lot. 23 24 (Court adjourned at 3:10 p.m.) 25

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION I, Debra L. Potocki, RMR, RDR, CRR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically recorded above proceedings. S/Debra L. Potocki Debra L. Potocki, RMR, RDR, CRR